What is a one sentence summary of your feature request?
Improve the logic and classification of Content Threat Blocked/Detected events in Content Aware reporting so that the product does not trigger policy-violation events for benign actions such as reading files from USB devices or simply mounting a USB storage device.
Please describe your idea in detail. What is your problem, why do you feel this idea is the best solution, etc.
During regular monitoring of Content Aware events, we observed scenarios where the product generates Content Threat Blocked/Detected events that do not reflect an actual policy violation or user action that transfers sensitive data. These cases introduce noise and require auditors to manually verify the legitimacy of each event by carefully checking the Source and Destination columns.
This leads to unnecessary overhead, difficulty interpreting events correctly, and a higher risk of misclassification or alert fatigue.
Scenarios observed:
-
Events triggered when a user reads a file from a USB storage device:
When a user opens (reads) a file stored on a USB device, Netwrix generates a Content Threat Blocked or Content Threat Detected event depending on the policy action (Block & Report / Report Only).
Importantly, no actual copying, transferring, or exfiltration action occurs—the user is simply opening a file from the device.
However, the event appears identical to one triggered when a user attempts to transfer or copy sensitive data, which is a true policy violation.
This creates confusion because the event metadata can misleadingly imply unauthorized data movement, even though the sensitive content remained on the external device and no outbound action took place. -
Events triggered simply by mounting a USB device
We also observed that merely mounting a USB storage device can generate Content Threat events, even when no user interaction with the content occurs.
This is especially problematic because:
- No file access has taken place
- No content has been transferred
- No user action aligns with the intent of content-aware policy enforcement
Auditors reviewing these events must manually differentiate them from real exfiltration attempts, which significantly slows down the review process and increases the cognitive load on security analysts.
Why this improvement is valuable:
- Reduces false positives: Prevents events from appearing as policy violations when no sensitive action has occurred.
- Improves accuracy of incident review: True violations stand out more clearly when benign actions are filtered out or labeled accurately.
- Saves substantial analyst time: Eliminates the need to manually validate every event by - Source/Destination to confirm if it represents an actual transfer action.
- Supports audit compliance: Cleaner event classification reduces the probability of misinterpretation during internal or external audits.
- Aligns better with user intent and policy purpose: The goal of Content Aware is to monitor content movement, not benign reading or device-mounting operations.
What the solution could look like:
- Any of the following enhancements would address the problem:
- Refine event logic so “read-only” actions (e.g., opening files on USB devices) do not produce Content Threat events.
- Differentiate event categories (e.g., “Content Accessed” vs. “Content Exfiltration Attempt”) so auditors can instantly understand the user action.
- Suppress events triggered by device mounting unless content is actually being accessed or transferred.
- Add a policy-side option allowing administrators to exclude read-actions or mount-actions from triggering Content Aware analysis.
Any of these changes would significantly improve clarity, reduce noise, and enhance usability of Content Aware reporting.
How do you currently solve the challenges you have by not having this feature?
At the moment, the only available workaround is manual verification of every Content Threat Blocked/Detected event by:
- Reviewing the Source and Destination columns in the Content Aware report
- Analyzing whether the action represents a true transfer attempt or simply a read/mount event
- Manually filtering events to determine which ones require investigation
This approach is:
- Time-consuming
- Error-prone
- Not scalable in environments with heavy USB usage
- Not intuitive for auditors unfamiliar with the nuances of how Content Aware currently triggers events
A built-in differentiation or suppression of non-violating actions would eliminate these pain points entirely.